Appositives, two-utterance monologues, and different kinds of meaning

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1. Introduction

- Appositives utterances like (1) give rise to two independent *explicatures* (i.e. entailments from *what is said*) simultaneously.

(1) **Lance, a cyclist**, is a figure of public ridicule.

(2) The bidimensional claim (Potts 2005):
   a. PRACTICAL: Utterances like (1) are best modelled using distinct semantics types.
   b. CONCEPTUAL: Unlike their hosts, appositives never give rise to *at-issue* entailments.

Goal of this talk
§2 - Show that Potts’ compositional-semantic analysis is infeasible. [Contrary to (2a)]
   - Propose that utterances like (1) merely consist of two ‘jumbled-up’ root clauses.
§3 - Show that the root clause analysis from §2 engenders a simple pragmatic model of appositives, in which appositives can be *at-issue* entailments. [Contrary to (2b)]
§4 - Show how further recourse to syntax can clarify some outstanding pragmatic issues.

Take-home message: better syntactic analyses can sometimes lead to simple explanations for otherwise puzzling pragmatic phenomena.

2. The syntax of appositives

- PRACTICAL claim for the bidimensional analysis from (2a):
  o Utterances like (1) are best modelled using distinct semantics types.

(1) **Lance, a cyclist, …** (Potts 2005:66)

   a. Syntactic information
   b. Semantic information

\[
\text{DP} \quad \text{NP[+COMMA]} \\
\text{Lance} \quad \text{D}^0 \quad \text{NP} \\
\text{a} \quad \text{cyclist} \\
\text{lance: } e^a \quad \text{cyclist(lance): } t^c \\
\text{comma(cyclist): } (e^a, t^c) \\
\text{cyclist: } (e^a, t^c)
\]

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1 This research was undertaken as part of the ERC-funded *Incomplete Parenthesis* project that was hosted by the *Center for Language and Cognition Groningen*, with which I was recently affiliated (until Feb 2015).
• The PRACTICAL claim is problematic for many empirical and conceptual reasons:2
  
  o Inferred anchors: no amount of type-shifting (Potts 2002) will make Polish mean Poland in (3):

    (3) Mary is Polish, a country I hope to visit one day.

    o Distribution: If appositive are adjuncts, no syntactic intervention should be observed. Also, appositive should branch the same way as ‘regular’ adjuncts in language X.

      Turkish: intervention allowed; adjuncts and appositive branch in dissimilar directions. (contra Potts 2005:106)

    (4) Ali Bey [tanı-dığ-im bir kız-ı], ki evli bir adam, taciz et-ti.
    Ali Mr. [know-NM-1SG a girl-ACC] LINK married a man harassment make-PST
    ‘Mr. Ali, a married man, harassed a girl that I know.’ (modified from Griffiths & Güneş 2014)

    o Overgeneralisation: Syntax is ‘blind’. Interpretative and articulatory constraints forbid certain syntactic concatenations (Chomsky 1995). Thus, adjunction should be possible wherever semantics allows for it.


    “Bob, hates John, loves Fred” is incorrectly predicted to be acceptable.

• Alternative to Potts (2005): appositions are reduced copulative main clauses

(7) \[\text{[ForceP1 John is coming to dinner]} \quad \text{No semantic-compositional connexion}\]
    \[\text{pertains between ForceP1 and ForceP2.} \]
    \[\text{[ForceP2 ([who/he] is) my neighbour]} \]

• The ‘root clause’ analysis in (7) maintains that appositive utterances are just ‘jumbled-up’ versions
  of sequentially-uttered root clauses:

(8) a. John, who’s my neighbour, is coming to dinner.
    b. John is my neighbour. He is coming to dinner.

3. Appositives in the discourse
• CONCEPTUAL claim for the bidimensional analysis from (2b):
  o Unlike their host clauses, appositives never give rise to at-issue entailments.
• Even in an update model of discourse that employs very simple assumptions, this conceptual claim
  can be shown to be false.

(9) At-issueness
  Where \(\alpha\) is an explicature and \(t^n\) is a juncture in conversational-time, \(\alpha\) is an at-issue explicature
  iff \(\alpha\) is the most recent explicature at \(t^n\).

(10) Conversational-time
  An instance of conversational-time passes every time an explicature-creating speech act (an SA)
  \(\alpha\) is fully articulated (i.e. when all the words that constitute \(\alpha\) have been uttered).

(11) John baked a nice cake.
    \[\begin{array}{c}
    t^0\\ t^1\\ t^2
    \end{array}\]
    • Adopting (10), utterances that contain appositives therefore distribute across conversational-time
      like two utterances sequentially expressed by one speaker (i.e. two-utterance monologues), as
      expected from the conclusions reached in §2

(12) Medial-appositives
    a. John, (who’s) my neighbour, is a fantastic cook.
    \[\begin{array}{c}
    t^0\\ t^1\\ t^2
    \end{array}\]
    b. John is my neighbour. He’s a fantastic cook.

³ Although irrelevant to this paper, it should be noted there is some disagreement about the exact syntactic relationship
  between ForceP1 and ForceP2 in (7). Some scholars claim that these two units are syntactically unrelated (Döring 2014),
  others argue that ForceP2 freely adjoins within ForceP1 (Griffiths 2015), and other pursue the idea that ForceP2 is
(13) **Final-appositives**

a. John has baked a cake, which is delicious.

b. John has baked a cake. It is delicious.

- Adopting (10), medial-appositives give rise to at-issue explicatures at \( t^1 \), while final-appositives give rise to at-issue explicatures at \( t^2 \).
- Thus, the conceptual claim in (2b) is false.

**Counterarguments to (7) and (8):**

[i] **Appeal to natural ends**: Our definition of what constitutes instances of conversational-time should only include those junctures at which a speaker’s turn could naturally end. Because a speaker’s turn cannot naturally end at \( t^1 \) in (12a), our definition of conversational time should be amended to reflect this:

(14) **Conversational-time** (amended version)

An instance of conversational-time passes every time an explicature-creating speech act (an SA) \( \alpha \) is fully articulated (i.e. when all the words that constitute \( \alpha \) have been uttered), and when no ‘incomplete’ SA \( \beta \) precedes \( \alpha \).

**Response to [i]**: There’s no a priori reason why our theoretical quantisation of conversational-time should reflect natural ending-points. If simpler characterisations about certain phenomena arise from disassociating these two properties, then disassociation should be favoured. To ensure that speakers properly finish their turns, one can posit the maxim in (11).

(15) **Avoid not finishing an SA that you start.**

[ii] **Appeal to speaker intentions**: Speakers don’t intend an instance of conversational-time to pass after a medial-appositive is uttered. Indeed, appositives are used to ‘sneak’ update-proposals into the discourse.

**Response to [ii]**: One could say the same about initial assertions of two-utterance monologues (e.g. 12b). Unless overtly rejected, update-proposals engendered from such SAs become successful when superseded by more current SA, too.

**Evidence for (7) and (8) from response particles:**

- **Generic responses** (yes, no, that’s great, it’s impossible) can only target:
  (i) the current explicature;
  (ii) a contiguous array of explicatures that includes the current explicature.

(Koev 2013, Krifka 2013, Griffiths 2015)
(16) A:  [α John came over yesterday.] [β Mary baked a cake earlier.] [γ It was a Battenberg.]
B:  That’s not true!
✓ if B targets only γ  × if B targets only β
✓ if B targets only γ+β  × if B targets only α
✓ if B targets γ+β+α  × if B targets only β+α

• At \( t_2 \), neither the medial-appositive in (12a) nor the initial assertion in (12b) are \textit{current}. As such, neither can be uniquely targeted by generic responses, as (17) shows.

(12) \textit{Medial-appositives}
  a.  \textbf{John}, (who’s) my neighbour, \textit{is} a fantastic cook.
  \[ \begin{array}{c}
  \downarrow \\
  \uparrow \\
  \uparrow \\
  \downarrow \\
  \end{array} \]
  \[ t^0 \quad t^1 \quad t^2 \]
  b.  John is my neighbour. \hspace{0.5cm} He’s a fantastic cook.

(17) A:  [β John, [α (who’s) my neighbour,] is a fantastic cook.]
A’:  [α John is my neighbour.] [β He’s a fantastic cook.]
B:  That’s not true!
✓ if B targets only β  × if B targets only α
✓ if B targets only β+α

• At \( t_2 \), both the final-appositive in (13a) and the final assertion in (13b) are current. As such, both can be uniquely targeted by generic responses, ass (18) shows. (Koev 2013, AnderBois et al. 2015)

(13) \textit{Final-appositives}
  a.  John has baked a cake, \textit{which is delicious}.
  \[ \begin{array}{c}
  \downarrow \\
  \uparrow \\
  \uparrow \\
  \downarrow \\
  \end{array} \]
  \[ t^0 \quad t^1 \quad t^2 \]
  b.  John has baked a cake. \hspace{0.5cm} It is delicious.

(18) A:  [α John has baked a cake,] [β \textit{which is delicious}.]
A’:  [α John has baked a cake.] [β It is delicious.]
B:  That’s not true!
✓ if B targets only β  × if B targets only α
✓ if B targets only β+α

• At \( t_1 \), the opposite situation pertains:

(19) For (12):  For (13):
A:  [β John, [α (who’s) my neighbour,] –
A’:  [α John is my neighbour.] –
B:  \textit{(referring to α): That’s not true!}  B:  \textit{(referring to α): That’s not true!}
• Evidently, it is more polite to disrupt the monologues in (12b) and (12b) at $t^1$ than it is to disrupt the appositive utterances in (12a) and (13a) at $t^1$.

• But if the simple assumption in (10) is retained, one cannot deny that the explicatures of medial-appositives are, at some juncture in conversational-time, current. They are not inherently imposed on the discourse, as AnderBois et al. (2015) maintain.

• My claim, that appositive utterances are merely ‘jumbled up’ variants of monologues, is supported by additional comparisons:
  
  o Same distribution with respect to plugging
    
    (20)  
    a. Pete thinks that John, (who’s) my neighbour, loves football.
    b. John’s my neighbour. Pete thinks that John loves football.

  o Same distribution with respect to antibackgrounding
    
    (21) Interpretation of (20a-b):
      a. Pete thinks that John loves football. John’s my neighbour.
      b. # Pete thinks that John loves football and that John’s my neighbour.

  o Same distribution with respect to contingency
    
    (22)  
    a. # John’s my neighbour. We go fishing together. He’s my neighbour.
    b. # John’s my neighbour. We go fishing together. John, who’s my neighbour, drinks beer.

  o Same inability to oppose oneself:
    
    (25)  
    a. # David, a bachelor, is a married man.
    b. # David is a bachelor. He is a married man.

Summary of §3

• Contrary to the conceptual claim from (2b), utterances that contain appositives show the same pragmatic behaviour as two-utterance monologues.

• Like all explicatures, the explicatures of medial-appositives cease to be current when they are supplanted by more recent explicatures.

• Both the claims in (2a) and (2b) proven incorrect, no reasons to adopt the bidimensional approach to appositives remain.

4 For more comparisons between monologues and appositive utterances, see Griffiths & De Vries (2014) and Griffiths (2015).
4. Using syntax to clarify some outstanding issues: reformulative versus attributive appositives

(26) **Attributive** appositives ascribe properties to their anchors
**Reformulative** appositives are alternative names for their anchors


(27) a. *The Big Apple, a magical place, is huge.*
    b. *The Big Apple, New York, is huge.*

- The addition of reformulative markers (Blakemore 1996, 2007) and temporal adverbs disambiguates otherwise ambiguous nominal appositives

(28) *London, the capital of England, is a dirty city.*

(29) a. *London, currently the capital of England, is a dirty city.* (attributive)
    b. *London, i.e. the capital of England, is a dirty city.* (reformulative)

- Potts (2005) only discusses attributive appositives
- Because utterances that contain attributive appositives are composed of two independent root clauses (see 7), the expectation that they pattern like two-utterance monologues was met (see §3).

Q: What’s the syntax of reformulative appositives?
- Griffiths (2015): Reformulative appositives are coordinated with their anchors in a ‘regular’ manner:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(30)} & \quad TP & \text{TP} \\
& \quad \&P & \text{VP} \\
& \quad \text{DPanchor} & \text{i.e.} & \text{DPapp} & \text{is a dirty city} \\
& \quad \text{London,} & \text{the capital} & \text{of England,} & \\
\end{align*}
\]

Evidence for (30) from c-command effects:

(31) **Negative polarity items** (NPIs)
    a. Paul hasn’t received **penny-one, anything, from his bank.**
    a’. Paul hasn’t received **anything, penny-one, from his bank.**
    b. Grant doesn’t own any knives or any forks.

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5 See Griffiths & Güneş (2014) and Griffiths (2015) for additional syntactic and prosodic evidence for a ‘subclausal coordination’ approach to reformulative appositives.
(32) **Quantifiers**
   a. Every competitor on the cookery TV programme was told that his entry, that is to say his jam roly-poly with custard, was too stodgy.
   b. Every cricketer remembers his first century and his first maiden over.

**Evidence for (30) from ATB-movement:**

(33) a. [Which country]₁ do you hate the roads of t₁ and the traffic of t₁ the most?
    b. * [Which country]₁ do you hate the roads of t₁ and the traffic of [it/that country] the most?

(34) a. [Which country]₁ do you hate **the motorways of** t₁, or as the Americans say **the 'highways' of** t₁, the most?
    b. * [Which country]₁ do you hate **the motorways of** t₁, or as the Americans say **the 'highways' of** [it/that country], the most?

Q: From this syntax, what expectations arise for the pragmatics of reformulative appositions?

- **Projection**: subclausal coordinands can be plugged

(35) a. A: That cult believes some silly stuff.  
    B: I know! I heard they think that mana and life-force are in the air around us!
    b. Mary wants to date an Italian and a Spaniard simultaneously.

(36) a. A: That cult believes some silly stuff.  
    B: I know! I heard they think that **mana**, that is to say **magical power**, is in the air around us.
    b. Mary wants to date **an Italian**, that is to say **a rich one**.  (cf. Wang et al. 2005)

**NB:** If disambiguated as attributive appositives (rather than reformulative ones) by the insertion of temporal adverbs, only an unplugged reading is available:

(37) Mary wants to date **an Italian**, currently **a rich one**.  (√ de re; × de dicto)

- **Generic responses**: because they are not SAs, subclausal coordinands are not targets of generic responses

(38) a. A: Bill and Ben (B: # That’s not true!) are flowerpot men.  
    b. A: **The Big Apple**, New York (B: # That’s not true!), is a nice place.

**Summary of §4**

- Reformulative and attributive appositives are wholly dissimilar syntactic phenomena.
- Potts (2005) ignored this well-known division, which resulted in overgeneralisations.
- Better syntactic analyses may lead to simple explanations of otherwise puzzling pragmatic phenomena.

5. **Conclusion**

- Because **attributive** appositives constitute independent SAs, appositives are not ‘inherent’ CIs (unlike expressives, epithets, etc.).
• Because reformulative appositives are subclausal coordinands of their host, they are not CIs either (as per 1d).

• If the ‘CI-dimension’ exists at all, appositives are not on it. Like other SAs (‘regular’ assertions, questions, commands, etc.) appositives are merely continual day-trippers across the at-issue/non-at-issue boundary of meaning.

References


Appendix: Continued from §3… appositives as question-answerers

- AnderBois et al. (2015): appositives cannot be at-issue, as they cannot answer the question under discussion (QUD).

(39) A: Who had prostate cancer?
B: ?? Tammy, *who had prostate cancer*, was being treated at the Dominican hospital.

- If this claim were correct, it would weaken the conclusions reached in §3.
- I contend that AnderBois et al.’s claim is too strong, and that the ability to answer questions is not an accurate diagnostic of at-issueness.
- Rather, the following preference principle exists:

(40) Preferably, a question α is answered by whichever speech act is begun immediately after α is asked.

- Appositives can never begin a speaker’s turn (cf. Arnold 2007), so they make for dispreferred ‘question-answerers’.
- However, appositives *may* answer questions when made salient enough (see 41a), in-line with (40). The same holds for monologues, too (see 41b).

(41) A: Does David have a job?
   a. B: David, *who indeed DOES have a job*, now works for Google.
   b. B′: Well, he’s paying his rent. So yes, David indeed *DOES* have a job.